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THE PROBLEM WITH PRESENT-VALUE: HOW LOCAL
BANKRUPTCY RULES IMPOSE HEAVY BURDENS ON
CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS
ABSTRACT
When Congress created the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it left open several
gaps that needed to be resolved through the judicial system. One of these gaps
concerns the process behind the present-value analysis required by Section
1325, which states that debtors must pay creditors the present value of their
claims over the course of the debtor’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. This process
implicitly dictated that debtors must pay a discount rate to properly compensate
their creditors. Because Congress never indicated how this discount rate should
be calculated, bankruptcy courts created several different solutions to the
problem. This left the bankruptcy system in a state of chaos as the rules varied
substantially from district to district.
In Till v. SCS Credit Corp., the Supreme Court attempted to tackle this
problem and bring clarity to the situation but was unable to do so. The Court
was split 4-4-1, which seemingly left the process for creating the Chapter 13
discount rate unclear. While many courts chose to treat the plurality decision as
binding precedent, some bankruptcy courts created local rules that set a
presumptive Chapter 13 discount rate to be used in all bankruptcy cases.
These courts failed to see that Till did in fact reach a majority holding: A
Chapter 13 debtor is presumed to satisfy their present-value burden when they
pay a discount rate that is greater than or equal to the national prime rate. The
creditor then bears the burden of showing that the discount rate should be
higher. By setting a presumptive rate, the local rules created by bankruptcy
courts shift at least part burden of proof onto the shoulders of debtors, who do
not have reliable access to the information they need to litigate the claim and
lower the discount rate.
This Comment argues that these local rules violate the Rules Enabling Act
because they alter the substantive rights of debtors. Burdens of proof are
substantive aspects of a litigant’s claim, and rulemaking committees that shift
this burden are encroaching on Congress’s rulemaking power. By setting a
presumptive discount rate and giving the debtor burden to change it, debtors
may be forced to pay more money over the course of their plans, therefore
affecting their ability to repay their debts and obtain the financial relief that they
are entitled to receive.
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INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, commonly
referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, one of its primary goals was to create
uniform laws to govern the bankruptcy process.1 While Congress was largely
able to accomplish this goal, the Bankruptcy Code still contains several gaps that
must be filled by the judicial system.2 One of these gaps concerns the Chapter
13 present-value analysis, which has led courts to create a variety of potential
solutions in an attempt to bring clarity to the situation.3
When debtors file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, they promise to pay back
their creditors over a period of three to five years using their future income.4 The
Bankruptcy Code requires that over the course of the debtor’s plan, secured
creditors should receive the present value of their claim and unsecured creditors
should receive the present value of the amount each creditor would receive if its
claim was liquidated in Chapter 7.5 This places a burden on debtors by requiring
them to show that they can pay each of their creditors the amount they are owed
in order to confirm their plan.6 This “present-value analysis” essentially requires
bankruptcy courts to select a “discount rate,” which accounts for factors such as
inflation and opportunity cost, in order to determine whether the debtor’s stream
of future payments to creditors has a present value equal to the amounts to which
the Bankruptcy Code entitles them.7
1
Adam J. Wiensch, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law,
79 GEO. L.J. 1831, 1831 (1991) (“The new Rules were also intended to achieve uniformity in bankruptcy
practice, which varied greatly from district to district and referee to referee.”).
2
See Matthew H. O’Brien, Tilling the Cram Down Landscape: Using Securitization Data to Expose the
Fundamental Fallacies of Till, 59 VAND. L. REV. 257, 258 (2006).
3
Rafael I. Pardo, Reconceptualizing Present-Value Analysis in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 113, 115 (2011) (“No uniform rule of decision has emerged on this issue. Instead, a multitude of
approaches has proliferated within and across circuits.”).
4
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (2012) (stating that the debtor must submit “all or such portion of future
earnings or other future income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the
execution of the plan”); id. § 1322(a)(2) (“The plan … shall provide for the full payment, in deferred cash
payments, of all claims.”); id. § 1322(d)(1) (for above median debtors “the plan may not provide for payments
over a period that is longer than 5 years”); id. § 1322(d)(2) (for below median debtors, “the plan may not provide
for payments over a period that is longer than 3 years, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer period, but
the court may not approve a period that is longer than 5 years”).
5
Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (“[W]ith respect to each allowed secured claim … the value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim.”); id. § 1325(a)(4) (“[T]he value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim [may not be] less than the amount that
would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such
date.”).
6
Id. § 1325(a)(4).
7
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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While the Bankruptcy Code places this burden on the debtor, it does not give
guidance on how to calculate a discount rate that satisfies it.8 Over time, circuit
courts developed four different methods to fill this gap in the Bankruptcy Code:
the formula approach, the coerced loan approach, the presumptive contract
approach, and the cost-of-funds method.9 These differing approaches resulted in
vastly different discount rates, which forced similarly situated debtors to pay
their creditors varying amounts and potentially affected their ability to repay
their debts.10 Importantly, a failed Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan could lead a court
to dismiss the case or convert it to a Chapter 7 case, in which the debtor’s assets
would be liquidated to satisfy creditor claims.11
In Till v. SCS Credit Corp.,12 the Supreme Court attempted to solve this issue
and bring clarity to the Chapter 13 present-value analysis.13 Unfortunately, it
failed.14 The Justices split 4-4-1 on the issue, thus failing to come to a majority
consensus on which method to adopt.15 Justice Thomas disagreed with the other
eight Justices about whether it was appropriate to include a debtor-specific risk
adjustment in the discount rate, and thus did not join either side.16 Although the
Court ultimately used the formula approach to calculate the discount rate,17 its
apparent failure to reach a majority decision meant that some bankruptcy courts
did not treat it as binding precedent.18
Till has drawn criticism from commentators, many of whom believe that the
Supreme Court spoiled “a marvelous opportunity to impose some much-needed
8

Id. at 473–74.
Emma J. Guido, Till v. SCS Credit Corporation: A “Prime-Plus-Plus” Method Tilling Courts to
Consider Efficient Market Evidence, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 269, 279–82 (2016); see also Till, 541 U.S. at 373–
74.
10
Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60
UCLA L. REV. 384, 437 (2012).
11
Till, 541 U.S. at 479.
12
Id. at 465.
13
Id.
14
See Ralph Brubaker, Cramdown Interest Rates: Disarray Dominates Till…?, 24 No. 8 Bankr. L. Letter
1, Aug. 2004, at 1.
15
The plurality advocated for the formula approach, Till, 541 U.S. at 479–80, the dissent advocated for
the presumptive contract rate approach, id. at 494 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Justice Thomas, the lone holdout,
argued that the discount rate should not include a risk adjustment, id. at 486 (Thomas, J., concurring).
16
Justice Thomas ultimately sided with the plurality’s 9.5% discount rate because it gave the closest
valuation to the risk-free rate of interest. See id. at 491 (Thomas, J., concurring).
17
Id. at 479–80 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he … formula rate best comports with the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code.”). The formula approach calculates the discount rating by adding a debtor-specific risk
adjustment to a national prime rate of lending, which is meant to ensure that the discount rate accounts for both
general economic conditions and the specific financial record of individual debtors. Id. at 478–80.
18
See Bankr. D. Ut. LBR 2083-2(D)(1) (setting the initial discount rate equal to the parties’ contractual
interest rate rather than the prime rate).
9
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order and predictability on these determinations” by failing to reach a majority
decision.19 The Supreme Court seemingly did nothing to solve the present-value
analysis problem, and many believed its only real accomplishment was that it
eliminated two of the four methods that bankruptcy courts had previously
applied to Till.20
Since the Court was seemingly unable to conclusively decide the proper
approach to conducting the present-value analysis, bankruptcy courts once again
looked to fill in this gap in the Bankruptcy Code.21 Some courts have created
local rules that govern how they will calculate the discount rate used in the
Chapter 13 present-value analysis.22 While these rules generally follow the
formula-approach framework laid out by the Till plurality, the problem is that
the rules created a district-wide presumptive discount rate for all Chapter 13
cases that does not account for the individual debtor’s financial situation.23
Even though the rules include provisions that allow each party to rebut this
presumptive rate,24 this system is biased against debtors because they have less
access to relevant information.25 Creditors receive all relevant information about
the debtor’s financial background in the bankruptcy filing, but debtors do not
have the same knowledge of lending markets because they are not active
participants.26 The Till plurality supported the formula method because it places
the burden of proof on the creditor, the party with better access to information
about lending markets.27 These local rules shift this burden to debtors, who now
must present evidence about the factors bearing on the present-value analysis—
19
Brubaker, supra note 14, at 1; see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Creating a Calamity, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
319, 319 (2007) (asserting that the Justices did not “underst[and] the basic functioning of bankruptcy law”).
20
Brubaker, supra note 14, at 1.
21
Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 437.
22
Id. at 436–37 (“The Court’s failure to announce a rule with nationwide effect has given bankruptcy
courts the leeway to … [fashion] their own approaches to administering the Code’s present-value provision.”).
23
See Bankr. D. Haw. R. 3015-1(h)(2) (predetermining the formula approach’s risk adjustment to be
1.5%); Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 437–38 (“[T]he differences cannot be attributed to any geographical
variance in inflation, opportunity costs, or the risk of nonpayment.”).
24
E.g., Bankr. W.D. Mo. R. 3084-1(G)(3) (“Parties may introduce evidence to determine what the
applicable market rate of interest might otherwise be, on a case-by-case basis.”); Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6(c)
(“A party in interest objecting to the interest rate proposed in a chapter 13 plan … must do so before expiration
of the deadline.”).
25
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 484 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[A]ny information debtors
have about any of these factors is likely to be included in their bankruptcy filings, while the remaining
information will be far more accessible to creditors … than to individual debtors.”).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 484–85 (“[T]he formula approach, which begins with a concededly low estimate of the
appropriate interest rate and requires the creditor to present evidence supporting a higher rate, places the
evidentiary burden on the more knowledgeable party, thereby facilitating more accurate calculation of the
appropriate interest rate.”).
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which they likely do not have—if they desire to lower the discount rate.28 This
runs counter to the Till plurality’s assertion that the prime rate of interest is
presumed to satisfy the debtor’s burden of proving that creditors receive
adequate present value on their claims, unless the creditor proves otherwise.29
It also runs counter to an unrecognized majority holding contained in Till.
While there was no true five-Justice majority advocating for a single method,
there were five Justices that agreed on a major issue—namely, that the prime
interest rate presumptively satisfies a debtor’s present-value burden.30 On a caseby-case basis, creditors may argue that the prime rate is not high enough to
account for the riskiness of an individual debtor, but the burden is fully on the
creditor to do so.31 Once debtors establish that they are paying the prime rate,
the burden shifts onto the shoulders of their creditors.32
This approach of using local rules is problematic for two reasons. First, these
local rules create the same non-uniformity problems that prevailed in the preTill circuit split. The variation in those rules forces similarly situated debtors to
pay different discount rates due solely to the fact that the debtors filed for relief
in different jurisdictions.33 These rates are not based on factors that are debtor
specific, like geographical market conditions or the debtor’s actual risk of
nonpayment, but instead are entirely based on the general formula that these
courts have promulgated through their local rules.34
Second, these local rules violate the Rules Enabling Act because they affect
the substantive rights of debtors.35 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
the burden of proof is a substantive aspect of a claim.36 By shifting the burden
of proof from the creditor to the debtor, these courts have created substantive
laws that impact how much debtors will pay back over the course of their plan.37
28

Id. at 484.
See id. (“[W]e principally differ with the dissent … over which party (creditor or debtor) should bear
the burden of rebutting the presumptive rate (prime or contract, respectively).”); id. at 479 (noting that the
formula approach “places the evidentiary burden squarely on the creditors”).
30
Infra notes 292–297 and accompanying text.
31
Infra notes 292–297 and accompanying text.
32
Id.
33
Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 436–37.
34
Id. at 437.
35
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(a), 2075 (2012); Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 437 (“[C]ourts are using their
local rulemaking processes to enact rules or to promulgate official forms that affect substantive rights.”).
36
See, e.g., Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20–21 (2000) (“Given its importance to the
outcome of cases, we have long held the burden of proof to be a ‘substantive’ aspect of a claim. That is, the
burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself; one who asserts a claim is entitled to the burden of
proof that normally comes with it.” (citations omitted)).
37
Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 438 (“[A]ll else being equal, debtors subject to a higher discount rate
29
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These rules also affect debtors’ ability to repay their debts because some debtors
will have to arbitrarily pay a higher amount each month based solely on this
predetermined rate.38 Because Chapter 13 plan denial or failure can cause
debtors to lose their homes, their vehicles, or other important assets,39 the stakes
are so high that even small differences in the amounts debtors pay each month
could have dire consequences on their quality of life.
Since some bankruptcy courts use local rules and local forms to implement
these presumptive Chapter 13 discount rates, they must abide by the limitations
established by the Rules Enabling Act.40 Congress created the Rules Enabling
Act to establish clear boundaries between the rulemaking power of federal courts
and Congress’s power to create substantive law.41 This is important because it
maintains the separation of powers principle that is a cornerstone of the U.S.
government.42
The Rules Enabling Act provides that local rules “shall not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right.”43 By creating local rules that set a presumptive
Chapter 13 discount rate, these bankruptcy courts have modified the substantive
rights of debtors by shifting the burden of proof by forcing them to argue that a
lower rate satisfies the present-value analysis. To fix this problem, these courts
need to repeal their local rules and follow the Till plurality’s guidance by placing
the burden of adjusting the discount rate on creditors rather than debtors.
This Comment is based on a survey of the ninety-four U.S. bankruptcy
courts’ local rules and local forms to identify those courts that have promulgated
local rules establishing presumptive discount rates in Chapter 13 cases. To
demonstrate how such rules violate the Rules Enabling Act, this Comment will
proceed in four parts. Part I overviews the source of bankruptcy rulemaking

must pay more to creditors to obtain Chapter 13 relief.”).
38
Id. at 437–38. While debtors are able to challenge this rate during a bankruptcy hearing, the relative
impact of the discount rate is less than the impact of other issues—such as the value of property of the bankruptcy
estate—so debtors will likely forgo litigating the discount rate in favor of allocating resources to litigating these
other issues. Infra notes 330–331 and accompanying text.
39
If a debtor’s plan is denied or fails, their case may be converted to Chapter 7 bankruptcy wherein their
assets are subject to being sold in order to pay off their debts. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (2012).
40
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
41
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106–07 (1982) (“The
1924 Senate Hearing and contemporary literature confirm that ‘procedure’ and ‘substantive rights,’ as used in
the Cummins bill, were understood to demarcate the spheres of lawmaking appropriate for the Supreme Court
acting as rulemaker and for Congress.”).
42
Id.
43
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). This language is mirrored in the Bankruptcy Rules Enabling Act, which extends
the Court’s rulemaking power by allowing it to create bankruptcy rules. Id. § 2075.
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powers and discusses limitations imposed by the Rules Enabling Act. Part II
describes the history of the Chapter 13 discount rate, including the pre-Till
circuit split, the Till case itself, and the implications of the Supreme Court’s
failure to clearly select a present-value approach. Part III shows the extent to
which bankruptcy courts use local rules to calculate the discount rate and how
these differing rules affect similarly situated debtors. Part IV discusses how
these rules violate the Rules Enabling Act by shifting the burden of proof and
presents other, softer issues that these rules cause. It also discusses possible
reforms that would keep courts from running afoul of the Bankruptcy Code and
protect debtors from the problems caused by these rules.
SOURCES OF AND LIMITATIONS ON BANKRUPTCY RULEMAKING POWERS

I.

When Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act in 1934, it did so with the
intention of delegating some of its rulemaking power to the Supreme Court to
help improve court procedures.44 In 1964, Congress expanded this power by
allowing the Court to create rules governing the procedure of bankruptcy cases.45
Since then, bankruptcy courts have used this power to make rules controlling
various aspects of bankruptcy proceedings, including the present-value
analysis.46 The following Sections detail the rulemaking power granted to
bankruptcy courts and the limitations imposed on this power by the Rules
Enabling Act.
A. Sources of Bankruptcy Rulemaking Power
A court’s power to create local rules is governed by Rule 9029 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”).47 Bankruptcy Rule
9029 provides that each district court “may make and amend rules governing
practice and procedure in all cases and proceedings within the district court’s
bankruptcy jurisdiction.”48 Such rules must be consistent with the Bankruptcy
Rules and other “Acts of Congress,” and they must be created pursuant to Rule
83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Federal Rules”).49 Further,
Bankruptcy Rule 9029 allows each district court to delegate its local bankruptcy

44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. § 2072; Burbank, supra note 44, at 1106.
28 U.S.C. § 2075; Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-623, 78 Stat. 1001.
See, e.g., Bankr. D. Haw. R. 3015-1(h)(2).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029.
Id. § (a)(1).
Id.
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rulemaking power to the district’s bankruptcy judges, as long as the procedure
for rulemaking still complies with Federal Rule 83.50
Similarly, bankruptcy rulemaking power can be found within 28 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (the “Bankruptcy Rules Enabling Act”).51 While this statute is meant to
give the Supreme Court the power to create procedural bankruptcy rules, it poses
limitations that also apply to all bankruptcy courts in general.52 The most
important limitation requires that the rules be procedural in nature, and shall not
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”53 This means that all
bankruptcy rules must be purely procedural and may not create or alter
substantive law.54

B. Substance vs. Procedure
While “substance” and “procedure” may appear to be two distinct concepts,
in practice the difference between them is unsettled.55 Congress originally
created this substantive-versus-procedural dichotomy to allocate lawmaking
power between the Supreme Court and Congress.56 The legislative history of the
Rules Enabling Act suggests that Congress meant the term “substantive right”
to be construed broadly so that the Supreme Court would not infringe on
Congress’s legislative powers.57
Prior to the 1998 amendment to the Rules Enabling Act, courts interpreted
the phrase “substantive right” narrowly, which gave them a substantial amount
of rulemaking power.58 When Congress amended the Act, it once again stated

50

Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2012).
52
This means that decisions from cases that interpret the Bankruptcy Rules Enabling Act also apply to
the local bankruptcy rules created by each district. Id.; LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III & NANCY F. MACLEAN,
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE MANUAL: FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE ANNOTATED § 9029:2
(2019 ed.).
53
28 U.S.C. § 2075; In re Adams, 734 F.2d 1094, 1099 (5th Cir. 1984); Pardo & Watts, supra note 10,
at 437.
54
See AHERN, III & MACLEAN, supra note 52; RULE 83: BANKRUPTCY RULE 9029–LOCAL BANKRUPTCY
RULES § 5:316, Westlaw BKRLIT (database updated Sept. 2018).
55
Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 47, 105 (1998) (“[I]f commentators and the courts can agree on nothing else, they can agree that
the terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ have no plain meaning.”).
56
Burbank, supra note 41, at 1106.
57
Id. at 1120–21 (“Where a doubt exists as to the power of a court to make a rule the doubt will surely
be resolved by construing a statutory provision in such a way that it will not have the effect of an attempt to
delegate to the courts what is in reality a legislative function.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 1174, at 11 (1926))).
58
Note, The Rules Enabling Act and the Limits of Rule 23, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2294, 2297–98 (1998)
[hereinafter Harvard Note].
51
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its desire to have the phrase interpreted broadly by alluding to the idea that the
Rules Enabling Act is not restricted to protecting rights directly conferred by
substantive law, but that it also prevents court rules from altering remedies
available under those laws.59 Congress’s repeated effort to restrict the courts’
rulemaking power shows that it meant to preserve its rulemaking authority and
only delegate enough power to them as was necessary to improve court
procedures.60 The Supreme Court has not often followed this guidance.61 In fact,
the Supreme Court has never overturned a court rule because it violated the
Rules Enabling Act.62 The Court often relies on the reasoning that nearly any
court rule that is meant to be purely procedural will likely incidentally impact a
person’s substantive rights as well.63
While the Court has not articulated a clear test to determine what is a
substantive right since the Rules Enabling Act was amended in 1998, it has
explained some of the factors to consider when making such an inquiry. Courts
must look at the “actual function and effect of the rule” to determine whether it
is substantive or procedural.64 If the rule “governs only the manner and means
by which the litigants’ rights are enforced,” then it is procedural.65 If the rule
alters “the rules of decision by which [the] court will [adjudicate] those rights,”
then it is substantive.66 In other words, if the local bankruptcy rule merely
regulates the manner in which the bankruptcy court carries out its
responsibilities, then it is procedural; otherwise, it creates substantive law.67
Even though the Supreme Court has never overturned a rule, it has suggested
a willingness to do so under the right circumstances.68 In Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp.,69 the Court established that court rules should be interpreted
“in light of the scope of the congressional authorization” given in the Rules

59
H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21–22 (1985) (“[P]roposed section 2072 contains independent limitations on
supervisory court rulemaking, which Congress has the power to impose and which have the effect of delegating
only a portion of Congress’ power.”); Kelleher, supra note 55, at 103.
60
See Harvard Note, supra note 58, at 2305.
61
See id. at 2297–98.
62
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010).
63
Id. (“The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; most procedural rules do.”);
Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (“Undoubtedly most alterations of the rules of practice
and procedure may and often do affect the rights of litigants.”).
64
Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 720 F.2d 804, 809 (4th Cir. 1983).
65
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407.
66
Id.; AHERN, III & MACLEAN, supra note 52.
67
See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407; AHERN, III & MACLEAN, supra note 52.
68
Kelleher, supra note 55, at 105.
69
496 U.S. 384 (1990).
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Enabling Act.70 The Court has also construed court rules narrowly to avoid an
interpretation that impacts substantive rights.71
Importantly, the Supreme Court has also held that the burden of proof is a
substantive aspect of a claim.72 Similarly, the Court has also found presumptions
to be substantive.73 These considerations are critical to the adjudication of a
claim because the initial presumption, which sets the burden of proof, can have
a profound impact on the outcome of a case. A rule that alters either of these
elements fundamentally changes the way a case is litigated, which substantially
impacts the rights of the litigants.
II. TILL V. SCS CREDIT CORPORATION: A COLOSSAL FAILURE TO BRING
CLARITY TO THE CHAPTER 13 PRESENT-VALUE ANALYSIS
One area of bankruptcy law impacted by local rules is the Chapter 13
present-value analysis. As mentioned previously, the present-value analysis
entails creating a discount rate that debtors will pay creditors over the course of
their Chapter 13 plan.74 This discount rate compensates the creditor for factors
such as inflation, opportunity cost, and risk of the debtor’s nonpayment of their
debts.75 The Bankruptcy Code is silent as to how to calculate this discount rate,
so courts created different methods to fill in this gap.76 When the Supreme Court
failed to clearly resolve this issue in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., bankruptcy courts
later created local rules to further refine this analysis.77 Part III will analyze the
scope and effect of these rules. To set a helpful backdrop for this analysis, this
Part first describes the different methods bankruptcy courts once used to conduct
the present-value analysis. Thereafter, this Part details the background and
holding of Till and then examines the implications of the Supreme Court’s
failure to clearly select a discount rate method.

70

Id. at 391.
Kelleher, supra note 55, at 49.
72
See Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20–21 (2000) (“Given its importance to the outcome
of cases, we have long held the burden of proof to be a ‘substantive’ aspect of a claim. That is, the burden of
proof is an essential element of the claim itself; one who asserts a claim is entitled to the burden of proof that
normally comes with it.” (citations omitted)).
73
Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959).
74
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (plurality opinion); Guido, supra note 9, at 279–
83.
75
Guido, supra note 9, at 279–83.
76
Id.
77
See Bankr. D. Haw. R. 3015-1(h); Bankr. D. Ut. LBR 2083-2(D).
71
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A. Present-Value Analysis Prior to Till
Prior to the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Till, bankruptcy courts
were divided into four competing schools of thought over how to calculate the
present value of a stream of future payments by a debtor.78 Each approach sought
to compensate the creditor for opportunity costs, inflation, and the risk of
nonpayment, but differed over how exactly to calculate that risk.79 This led to
non-uniform treatment of debtors, as they would have to pay different discount
rates based entirely on the jurisdiction in which they filed their Chapter 13
plan.80
The first approach, often referred to as the “coerced loan” method,81 directed
bankruptcy courts to apply the “market rate of interest” for “loans of equivalent
duration and risk.”82 In effect, this approach is analogous to a scenario in which
the creditor made a new loan to the debtor for the value of the collateral, which
provided the creditor “market interest” on this hypothetical loan.83 Courts that
followed the coerced loan method looked at “similar loans” made in the region
and the original contract rate itself in order to determine the appropriate interest
rate.84 Opponents of this method asserted that it provided too high of a discount
rate because it included factors irrelevant to the repayment of a debt in
bankruptcy.85
Similarly, the “cost of funds” method set the interest rate at the rate that “the
creditor would have to pay to borrow the amount equal to the collateral’s
value.”86 Advocates for this method believed that it best reflected the present
value of a creditor’s claim because it compensated the creditor for the money
the creditor would need to pay back if it were to acquire the same amount of
capital.87 Despite the perceived accuracy of this method, many courts chose not
to follow it because of the high costs involved in its implementation.88 Further,

78

Guido, supra note 9, at 279–83.
Till, 541 U.S. at 474 (“A debtor’s promise of future payments is worth less than an immediate payment
of the same total amount because the creditor cannot use the money right away, inflation may cause the value of
the dollar to decline before the debtor pays, and there is always some risk of nonpayment.”); Guido, supra note
9
, at 279–83.
80
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 259–60.
81
Guido, supra note 9, at 279–80.
82
Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., ACA, 102 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1996).
83
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1993).
84
Id. at 67–68.
85
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 (2004) (plurality opinion).
86
In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2002).
87
In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997.
88
Id.; Guido, supra note 9, at 281–82.
79

MCDONOUGHCOMMENTPROOFS2_12.19.19

2019]

HEAVY BURDENS ON CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS

12/19/2019 1:02 PM

575

some courts believed that this method overemphasized the creditworthiness of
the creditor and did not take the actual risk of the debtor’s nonpayment into
consideration.89
A third method, the “presumptive contract rate” approach, created a
rebuttable presumption that the rate the creditor and the debtor agreed to in the
original contract adequately calculated the present value of the claim.90 Either
party could rebut this presumption and request a different rate by presenting
evidence related to the debtor’s risk of nonpayment.91 Proponents of this method
argued that it provided the most accurate assessment of the debtor’s risk of
nonpayment because it reflected both parties’ beliefs about the creditworthiness
of the debtor.92 Further, this presumption decreased both the frequency and
duration of disputes related to the discount rate because the discount rate started
at a number that both parties had previously agreed to.93 A major disadvantage
to this approach was that it relied heavily on the prior interactions between the
debtor and creditor, which may have forced similarly situated debtors to pay
“vastly different [discount] rates.”94
The fourth and final method is the “formula approach,” which determined
the discount rate by first looking to the national prime rate to set a baseline and
then adding a risk adjustment to reflect the debtor’s risk of nonpayment.95 This
risk adjustment was based on the individual debtor’s creditworthiness, which
was determined after a bankruptcy hearing between both parties.96 Those who
favored this method believed it adequately compensates the creditor for the risk
it is taking on while also ensuring that the rate is not set so high that it will “doom
the plan.”97 They believed that this method would produce the fairest outcome
because it starts with an independent analysis that does not take into account the
prior interactions between the two parties.98 Opponents of this method
contended that it fails to adequately compensate the creditor for the debtor’s risk
89
See, e.g., Till, 541 U.S. at 478 (“The cost of funds approach … mistakenly focuses on the
creditworthiness of the creditor rather than [the creditworthiness of] the debtor.”).
90
Till, 541 U.S. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 274.
91
Till, 541 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he most relevant factors bearing on risk premium are
(1) the probability of plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral depreciation; (3) the liquidity of the collateral market;
and (4) the administrative expenses of enforcement.”); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63,
70–71 (3d Cir. 1993); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 274.
92
Till, 541 U.S. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 492, 499.
94
Id. at 477–78 (plurality opinion).
95
Id. at 478–79.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 479–80.
98
Id.
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of nonpayment because it does not properly account for the costs a creditor takes
on if a debtor defaults.99
As can be seen by the variety of approaches to calculating the Chapter 13
discount rate, the Supreme Court badly needed to bring clarity to the situation.100
When Till v. SCS Credit Corp. rose up through the Seventh Circuit in 2004, the
Court finally took the opportunity to do so.101 Unfortunately, the Court was
unable to reach a consensus about which approach to use, which left Chapter 13
bankruptcy in a state of flux.102
B. The Factual Background and Procedural History of Till
In Till v. SCS Credit Corp., the Tills filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in order
to retain possession of a used truck that they had purchased the prior year.103 The
purchase agreement, which was assigned to SCS Credit Corporation
immediately following the purchase, stipulated that the Tills would pay back
their debt with a 21% interest rate and gave SCS the right to repossess the truck
if the Tills defaulted on their payments.104 When the Tills filed for bankruptcy,
they still owed $4,894.89 to SCS Credit Corporation.105 At the bankruptcy
hearing, the parties both agreed that the truck was only worth $4,000, leaving
SCS Credit Corporation with a $4,000 allowed secured claim and a $894.89
allowed unsecured claim against the truck.106 The only issue in the case was
deciding the discount rate that would give SCS the full present value of its
allowed secured claim.107
The Tills advocated for a discount rate created using the formula approach,
which was 9.5%.108 They reached this number by adding a 1.5% risk adjustment
to the national prime rate of 8%.109 The Tills argued that their risk of
nonpayment should be fairly low, since a bankruptcy judge will only confirm a

99

Id. at 503–04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Brubaker, supra note 14, at 1; Pardo, supra note 3, at 115–16.
101
Till, 541 U.S. at 479–80 (plurality opinion).
102
Id. at 465; Rasmussen, supra note 19, at 319.
103
Till, 541 U.S. at 469–70.
104
Id. at 470.
105
Id.
106
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest … is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the
estate’s interest in such property, … and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s
interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim.”).
107
Till, 541 U.S. at 469.
108
Id. at 471.
109
Id.
100
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bankruptcy plan if he or she believes that the debtor will be able to make all
payments required under the plan.110 SCS Credit Corporation objected to this
proposed rate, asserting that the coerced loan method was the correct standard
to use.111 SCS Credit Corporation contended that the 21% interest rate to which
the parties agreed in the purchase agreement accurately represented the rate that
SCS could obtain if it was able to reinvest the $4,000 “in loans of equivalent
duration and risk” and therefore gave the true present value of the claim.112
The procedural history of Till highlights the differences surrounding how
bankruptcy courts calculated the Chapter 13 discount rate. The bankruptcy court
sided with the Tills and confirmed their proposed plan, finding that the formula
approach gave the most accurate valuation because it is “closely tied to the
condition of the financial market and independent of the financial circumstances
of any particular lender.”113 The bankruptcy court also believed that the formula
approach produced a “very reasonable” discount rate given that Chapter 13 plans
“are supposed to be financially feasible” and that setting too high of a rate would
severely hinder the Tills’ ability to pay back their debt.114
The district court overturned this decision and changed the plan’s discount
rate to 21%, holding that the coerced loan approach should be used because it
best represented the overall market for subprime loans.115 The discount rate
should not be tied to the financial circumstances of the debtor, but should
represent the value the creditor could get from the market as a whole.116
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed in a 2-1 opinion
that the inquiry should focus on the interest rate a creditor could obtain by
making a similar loan and that the contract rate generally represents that interest
rate, but chose to modify the district court’s ruling by turning the contract rate
into a rebuttable presumption.117 This approach would allow both the debtor and
creditor to offer evidence showing that that the contract rate did not accurately
represent the risk of default by the debtor.118

110
Id. at 471–72; see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (“[T]he court shall confirm a plan if … the debtor will be
able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan.”).
111
Till, 541 U.S. at 471–72.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 472.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 472–73.
118
Id.
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The dissenting opinion by Judge Rovner considered yet another
methodology, the cost of funds method.119 While Judge Rovner ultimately
advocated for the formula approach, she also stated that the cost of funds method
used a straightforward inquiry that would adequately compensate the creditor
for its claim.120
The courts were so badly divided over how to correctly calculate the Chapter
13 discount rate that all four potential approaches were considered within the
history of one single bankruptcy case.121 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve this issue once and for all, but its fractured holding left the bankruptcy
system in a state of flux.122
C. The Supreme Court’s (In)decision in Till
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, began its analysis by
breaking down the discount rate into three component parts: opportunity cost,
inflation, and risk of nonpayment.123 Justice Stevens then stressed the need for
an objective inquiry that “treat[s] similarly situated creditors similarly” by
disregarding “the creditor’s individual circumstances, such as its pre-bankruptcy
dealings with the debtor or the alternative loans it could make if permitted to
foreclose.”124 Using this framework, the plurality rejected the coerced loan,125
presumptive contract rate,126 and costs of funds127 approaches because each
focuses on making the creditor whole rather than assessing the individual
debtor’s ability to repay.

119

In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting).
Id. (“Strictly speaking, the debtor’s retention of the collateral does not preclude the creditor from
making a new loan, it simply deprives the creditor of an asset that the creditor could convert into money and use
to fund the new loan. A straightforward way to account for that deprivation is to ask what it would cost the
creditor to obtain the cash equivalent of the collateral from an alternative source.”).
121
Till, 541 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion).
122
Brubaker, supra note 14, at 1.
123
Till, 541 U.S. at 474 (plurality opinion) (“A debtor’s promise of future payments is worth less than an
immediate payment of the same total amount because the creditor cannot use the money right away, inflation
may cause the value of the dollar to decline before the debtor pays, and there is always some risk of
nonpayment.”).
124
Id. at 476–77.
125
Id. at 477 (“[T]he coerced loan approach requires bankruptcy courts to consider evidence about the
market for comparable loans to similar (though nonbankrupt) debtors—an inquiry far removed from such courts’
usual task of evaluating debtors’ financial circumstances ….”).
126
Id. (“[T]he presumptive contract rate approach improperly focuses on the creditor’s potential use of the
proceeds of a foreclosure sale.”).
127
Id. at 478 (“The cost of funds approach … mistakenly focuses on the creditworthiness of the creditor
rather than the debtor.”).
120
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The plurality advocated for the formula approach because it entailed a
“straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry” that “depends only on the state
of financial markets, the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the
characteristics of the loan.”128 Further, the formula approach “places the
evidentiary burden squarely on the creditors,” the party whom the plurality
believed has better access to information about the market.129
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, agreed with the
plurality’s assessment of the three component parts to the discount rate
(opportunity cost, inflation, and risk of nonpayment), but disagreed over what
method accurately compensates the creditor for the debtor’s risk of default.130
Justice Scalia believed that the formula method would “systematically
undercompensate secured creditors for the true risks of default” and that the
presumptive contract rate is a better indicator of the actual risk to the creditor.131
A debtor in bankruptcy has already demonstrated that he or she has a higher risk
of nonpayment than the average subprime borrower simply by filing for
bankruptcy.132 The dissent argued that a creditor should be fully compensated
for this extra risk, and courts should “adopt a valuation method that has a
realistic prospect of enforcing that directive.”133 The presumptive contract rate
does this by starting with the contract rate originally agreed to by both parties—
which represents the parties’ beliefs about the debtor’s ability to repay the
loan134—and allows both parties to introduce evidence to reduce the risk factor
to an appropriate level.135
The plurality addressed this argument by pointing out that Chapter 13
debtors are, in theory, not more likely to default than non-bankruptcy debtors
because bankruptcy courts are only allowed to confirm plans if they have a high
probability of success.136 Rather than systematically raising all discount rates to
absurdly high rates because bankruptcy debtors have shown prior inability to
repay their loans, bankruptcy courts should just not confirm plans that they
believe might fail.137

128

Id. at 479.
Id.
130
Id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our only disagreement is over what procedure will more often
produce accurate estimates of the appropriate interest rate.”); Pardo, supra note 3, at 128–29.
131
Till, 541 U.S. at 491–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132
Id. at 493.
133
Id. at 508.
134
See id. at 494 (“[T]he contract rate reasonably reflects actual risk at the time of borrowing.”).
135
Id. at 498.
136
Id. at 482–83 (plurality opinion); see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2012).
137
Till, 541 U.S. at 482–83 (plurality opinion).
129
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Further, the plurality asserted that both the presumptive contract rate and
formula approaches should yield the same result if the court had perfect access
to information.138 Because the court does not have such access to information,
the creditors, who have the best information about lending markets, should bear
the evidentiary burden of changing whatever discount rate is initially set by the
bankruptcy court.139
Justice Thomas, the lone concurrence, had the opportunity to resolve the
issue by choosing between the formula and presumptive contract rate
approaches, but instead chose to advocate for an entirely new valuation method:
the “risk-free” discount rate.140 Relying on the plain meaning of the statute,141
Justice Thomas argued that the Bankruptcy Code requires courts to apply a
discount rate that only accounts for the value of the property to be distributed to
the holder of an allowed secured claim, not the value of the promise to distribute
that property to such a creditor.142 In other words, the risk of a debtor’s
nonpayment should never be considered when calculating the discount rate
because that risk has nothing to do with the actual value of the distributed
property.143 Further, creditors are already protected from the risk of a debtor’s
nonpayment by the method used to appraise the debtor’s property144 and by
specific provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.145
Both the plurality and dissent agreed that the “risk-free” approach was
incorrect.146 Pointing out that the entire weight of circuit authority compensates
creditors for risk, the Court also found that the present-value analysis should
take a debtor’s risk of nonpayment into consideration.147 Justice Scalia further
argued that the plain meaning of the statute does not support the “risk-free”
approach because the context of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) demonstrates that the

138

Id. at 484.
Id. at 484–85.
140
Id. at 486 (“[T]he statute that Congress enacted does not require a debtor-specific risk adjustment that
would put secured creditors in the same position as if they had made another loan.”).
141
See id. at 486, 489 (Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to the “clear text” and the “plain language” of
the statute).
142
Id. at 485–86.
143
See id. at 487 (“The statute only requires the valuation of the ‘property to be distributed,’ not the
valuation of the plan ….”).
144
Id. at 489 (noting that bankruptcy courts utilize a creditor friendly “replacement-value” standard rather
than the lower “foreclosure-value” standard).
145
Id. at 489–90.
146
Id. at 483 (plurality opinion); id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147
Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Circuit authority uniformly rejects the risk-free approach …. [A]ll
of them require some compensation for risk.”).
139
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provision is meant to be overprotective of creditors.148 The risk-free approach
would not compensate the creditors for any of the risk of the debtor’s
nonpayment, so it is not supported by the provision’s context.149
While some legal scholars advocate using Justice Thomas’ risk-free discount
rate,150 the majority of commentators agree that Justice Thomas mishandled the
case by sticking to his purely textual argument.151 Rather than creating a single
rule to use in all future Chapter 13 plan confirmation hearings, the Court
appeared to leave open the one issue it had set out to resolve.
D. Implications of the Supreme Court’s Indecision
The Supreme Court Justices, and especially Justice Thomas, were criticized
by commentators for their failure to adopt a definitive approach to calculating
the Chapter 13 discount rate.152 A major critique of the Court was that the
Justices made no attempt to “giv[e] effect to Congress’s intent” on the matter,
but instead chose to “forg[e] their own path” by reaching their conclusions based
on the consequences of their decision.153 As a result, the Court failed to reach a
clear majority decision and many questions about the Chapter 13 discount rate
were left unresolved.
1. Minor Questions Resolved by Till
Despite these flaws in the Court’s holding, it was able to resolve some other
minor questions surrounding the discount rate. The Court ruled 8-1 that every
present value analysis should include a risk adjustment that accounts for the
debtor’s risk of nonpayment of the claim.154 Despite Justice Thomas’ assertion
that the plain language of the statute only gives the creditor the right to the
present value of the property itself,155 the Court sided with the weight of legal

148
See id. at 505 (noting that the two other routes to confirmation besides the cramdown option are both
creditor protective, and thus it is unlikely that the cramdown option was meant to be under-protective).
149
See id.
150
See Pardo, supra note 3, at 118–19 (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code compels the use of a discount rate that
accounts solely for expected inflation, but that does not take into account opportunity cost or the risk of
nonpayment.”).
151
See, e.g., Brubaker, supra note 14, at 4–5; Guido, supra note 9, at 282; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 265–
74.
152
See, e.g., Brubaker, supra note 14, at 1; Rasmussen, supra note 19, at 321–22 (calling the Supreme
Court’s failure to come to a majority opinion a “calamity”).
153
Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 434 (2008).
154
Till, 541 U.S. at 508 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155
Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The statute only requires the valuation of the ‘property to be
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authority and gave the creditor compensation for the risk of the debtor’s
nonpayment.156
Further, the Court unequivocally rejected both the coerced loan and the cost
of funds approaches to calculating the discount rate.157 Given that neither the
plurality nor the dissent advocated for these methods—and that the plurality
explicitly ruled them out—Till can be seen as an implicit mandate to stop
applying these methods.158 While some commentators believed that bankruptcy
courts would continue to use both the formula and the presumptive contract rate
approaches,159 most courts have understood the Till decision as supporting the
formula approach over all other methods.160 Even with this general
understanding of the Till decision, some bankruptcy courts still follow the
presumptive discount rate approach.161
2. Burden of Rebutting the Initial Discount Rate
One of the main assertions in the plurality’s opinion was that the creditor
should bear the burden of rebutting the initial discount rate set by the court.162
The plurality reasons that a debtor already discloses all the information he or she
has that is relevant to determining the risk premium in their bankruptcy
filings.163 Creditors have better access to all other relevant information, which
makes them the more knowledgeable party and therefore more capable of
facilitating an accurate calculation of the discount rate.164 By choosing the
formula approach, the plurality intends the inquiry to begin with a low initial
discount rate and force creditors to present evidence about the debtor’s riskiness
if they desire to receive a higher rate.165

distributed,’ not the valuation of the plan (i.e., the promise to make the payments itself).”).
156
Id. at 483 (plurality opinion).
157
Id. at 477.
158
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 265–67.
159
Id. at 265, 267–68, 274.
160
In re Garner, 663 F.3d 1218, 1219 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s judgment that
the discount rate is calculated by using the formula method); In re Nichols, 440 F.3d 850, 859 n.8 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“The Court endorsed the use of the formula approach.”); see also In re MPM Silicones, 874 F.3d 787, 800 (2nd
Cir. 2017); In re Sunnyslope Housing, 859 F.3d 637, 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (each of which extends the formula
method to Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases). Contra In re Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, 710 F.3d 324, 331 (5th
Cir. 2013) (limiting the formula approach to cases which have the same facts as Till).
161
Infra Section III.A.2.
162
Till, 541 U.S. at 484–85 (plurality opinion).
163
Id. at 484.
164
Id. at 484–85.
165
Id. at 484.
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While the debtor still bears the overall burden of proving that secured
creditors receive the present value of their allowed secured claims under the
Chapter 13 plan,166 the plurality essentially presumes that the prime rate, along
with the addition of any risk premium,167 satisfies this burden unless the creditor
proves otherwise.168 By arguing for the risk-free approach—that the prime rate
alone adequately compensates creditors—Justice Thomas concurs with this
presumption, even though he disagrees with the inclusion of a risk premium.169
If the prime rate alone satisfies the debtor’s burden, then the addition of the risk
premium also must satisfy that burden.170 Therefore, Till can be interpreted to
create a rebuttable presumption that the prime rate plus any risk premium
satisfies the debtor’s burden. It then shifts the burden to the creditor, who now
must prove the inadequacy of the prime rate to account for the debtor’s risk of
nonpayment.
3. The Creation of Local Present-Value Analysis Rules
Instead of following this approach, some bankruptcy courts have used local
rules to create their own method for calculating both the prime rate and the risk
premium, which essentially creates an entirely new presumptive rate.171 For
example, the Western District of Missouri calculates the prime rate using the
five-year treasury note rate and tacks on a risk premium of 3% interest, no matter
the circumstances of the individual debtor.172 In the Western District of North
Carolina, bankruptcy courts take the prime rate of interest from the Wall Street
Journal and add a 2% risk adjustment.173 Both of these bankruptcy courts give
the debtor the opportunity to argue for a reduction of the discount rate at a
hearing,174 but these rules are problematic because they shift some of the burden

166

Id. at 486 (Thomas, J., concurring).
The plurality declined to identify a minimum threshold for the risk premium. Id. at 480 (plurality
opinion). While the plurality identified that lower courts typically select risk premiums in the range of one to
three percent, its explicit decision not to decide a range means that the risk premium could conceivably be any
value. See id.
168
Id. at 479 (noting that the formula approach “places the evidentiary burden squarely on the creditors”);
see also id. at 484 (“[W]e principally differ with the dissent … over which party (creditor or debtor) should bear
the burden of rebutting the presumptive rate (prime or contract, respectively).”).
169
Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
170
See id. at 491.
171
Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 436–37.
172
Bankr. W.D. Mo. R. 3084-1(G)(1) (“[T]he interest rate shall be the 5 year treasury note rate as of the
preceding June 1, plus 3% nominal interest rate per annum.”).
173
Bankr. W.D.N.C. LBR 3001-2(a) (“The presumptive interest rate for use in calculating the value of
payments to secured creditors for the entire term of the Chapter 13 plan is the composite prime interest rate plus
two percent (the ‘Till Rate’).”).
174
Bankr. W.D. Mo. R. 3084-1(G)(3); Bankr. W.D.N.C. LBR 3001-2(f).
167
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of proof from the creditor to the debtor—specifically, by requiring the debtor to
present evidence in support of a reduced discount rate. Considering that both
presumptions175 and burdens of proof176 are substantive aspects of claims, these
local rules may run afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.
These local rules also create a non-uniformity problem because debtors will
end up paying different rates based on the district where they reside.177 In the
above examples, debtors who reside in the Western District of Missouri and the
Western District of North Carolina will have different initial discount rates and
different burdens for lowering them.178 Even if debtors residing in these two
districts have the same financial history, the same debt, and the same ability to
repay their loans, they likely will pay different amounts over the duration of their
Chapter 13 plan.179 This difference is not tied to “any geographical variance in
inflation, opportunity costs, or the risk of nonpayment,” but instead is solely due
to the differences in these courts’ local rules.180 This lack of uniformity poses
problems of access to justice because these debtors will have separate burdens
of proof and therefore unequal opportunity to receive a favorable rate.
III. HOW DIFFERING LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULES IMPACT SIMILARLY
SITUATED CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS
While it is easy to note that there are differences in these local rules and
envision the effects that they have on debtors, it is difficult to understand the
actual effects the rules have without knowing the varied procedures that they
create. Little research has been done to show the differences between these rules
or identify the courts that have created them.181 This Part attempts to tackle this
issue by presenting the results of a survey of the ninety-four U.S. bankruptcy
courts’ local rules and forms.182 First, this Part classifies these results to identify
the number of bankruptcy courts that utilize local rules to create presumptive
discount rates and the various rules they have created. Next, this Part examines

175

Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959).
Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20–21 (2000); Dick, 359 U.S. at 446.
177
Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 437–38.
178
Supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
179
Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 438.
180
Id. at 437–38.
181
The research that has been done only identified some courts that created presumptive rates through
local rules to show that there are differences between them. See, e.g., Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 437–38.
It does not identify every such court, nor does it thoroughly explain the differences between the rules. See, e.g.,
id.
182
This includes the local bankruptcy rules create by Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana
Islands, which handle all bankruptcy matters in their district courts.
176
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the effects that these rules have on debtors by presenting examples based on
actual bankruptcy cases. This serves to highlight the problems caused by the
non-uniformity that results from courts’ differing local rules while also showing
how a presumptive discount rate might force debtors to make higher interest
payments under their Chapter 13 plans.
A. Compiled Information About the Scope of Bankruptcy Courts Using Local
Bankruptcy Rules to Set the Chapter 13 Rate
This Part surveys each district’s local bankruptcy rules to properly determine
which districts created local rules affecting Chapter 13 discount rates. Some
courts have not created a specific local rule that discusses the Chapter 13
discount rate, but instead they have created provisions in their local bankruptcy
forms that have the same effect.183 To account for these scenarios, this Part also
surveys each district’s local form for a Chapter 13 plan, if it has one, to determine
whether it incorporates a presumptive Chapter 13 discount rate.
The research findings are divided into three categories. Local bankruptcy
rules in the first category comply with the Till plurality’s use of the formula
approach, but create a presumptive Chapter 13 discount rate by setting a
predetermined risk adjustment for the entire district.184 The second category
contains local bankruptcy rules that follow the Till dissent’s use of the
presumptive contract rate approach rather than the formula approach to
determine the Chapter 13 discount rate.185 The final category comprises two
bankruptcy courts that do not use either approach, but instead create a
presumptive Chapter 13 discount rate in another manner.186
1. Districts That Use the Formula Approach But Set a Predetermined Risk
Adjustment
The local bankruptcy rules in the following districts apply the formula
approach to set the Chapter 13 district rate, which is the method that the Till
plurality adopted. This method starts with a prime rate and then adds a risk

183
See U.S. Bankr. Court for the Dist. of Idaho, Chapter 13 Plan and Related Motions (Jan. 1, 2016),
https://www.id.uscourts.gov/Content_Fetcher/index.cfml/Proposed_National_Rule/Form_Changes-_Ch_13_
Plan_2669.pdf%3FContent_ID%3D2669+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (providing that the Chapter 13
discount rate “shall be the non-default contract rate of interest provided in the contract between each Creditor
and Debtor(s)”).
184
See, e.g., Bankr. D. Haw. R 3015-1(h); Bankr. D. Neb. R. 3023-1.
185
See, e.g., Bankr. D. Ut. LBR. 2083-2(D); Bankr. D. Vt. LBR 3012-1.
186
See Bankr. S.D. Ga. R. 3001-2; Bankr. D.S.C.R. 3015-6.
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adjustment to account for the debtor’s risk of nonpayment.187 The bankruptcy
courts in these districts diverge from the Till plurality because they set a different
presumptive discount rate by creating a predetermined risk adjustment, which
shifts some of the burden of proof from the creditor to the debtor.
District of Hawaii: The local bankruptcy rule in Hawaii188 divides each
calendar year into two six-month long periods and then creates different Chapter
13 discount rates for each period.189 The Chapter 13 discount rate for each period
is calculated by finding the national prime rate of interest listed in the Wall Street
Journal on the first day of that period and then adding a risk adjustment of
1.5%.190 While the rule gives debtors and creditors the ability to propose a
different discount rate, this may still be problematic because many debtors likely
will not take this opportunity.191
District of Nebraska: The local bankruptcy rule in Nebraska192 starts with
the national prime rate of interest listed in the Wall Street Journal “on the last
day prior to the confirmation hearing.”193 Bankruptcy courts are then directed to
add a risk adjustment of 2% to the prime rate.194 Interestingly, the language used
in the local rule could lead to a scenario where two debtors file their Chapter 13
petitions on the same day, but pay different discount rates solely because one of
the debtor’s hearing was delayed.195
Western District of North Carolina: The local bankruptcy rule in the
Western District of North Carolina196 also uses the national prime rate of interest
187

Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Bankr. D. Haw. LBR 3015-1(h)(1) (“[T]he clerk will set and publish a standard interest rate applicable
to secured and other claims under a confirmed chapter 13 plan.”).
189
Bankr. D. Haw. R. 3015-1(h)(2).
190
Id. (“[T]he standard interest rate is the national prime rate of interest, as published in the Wall Street
Journal on the first business day of that period, plus 1.5%.”).
191
Bankr. D. Haw. R. 3015-1(h)(1) (“The setting of a standard interest rate does not bar a debtor or creditor
from proposing a different interest rate.”); infra notes 330–331 and accompanying text.
192
Neb. R. Bankr. P. 3023-1 (When determining “the value, as of the effective date of a plan, of property
to be distributed under a plan … there is a presumption that the appropriate interest rate shall equal the national
average of the prime rate … stated as a simple interest rate per annum, plus two percentage points.”).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Generally, the confirmation hearing occurs between twenty and forty-five days after the meeting of the
creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012). However, a bankruptcy court may delay the date of the confirmation hearing
if any of the creditors has objections to the proposed Chapter 13 Plan. Id. If creditors in one case delay the date
of the confirmation through multiple objections, that debtor may end up paying a different discount rate if the
prime rate changes within that time span. Neb. R. Bankr. P. 3023-1.
196
Bankr. W.D.N.C. LBR 3001-2(a) (“The presumptive interest rate for use in calculating the value of
payments to secured creditors for the entire term of the Chapter 13 plan is the composite prime interest rate plus
two percent (the ‘Till Rate’).”).
188
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listed in the Wall Street Journal,197 but it divides the valuation of the prime rate
based on the month that each claim is filed and then adds a 2% risk premium.198
Neither the Eastern District nor the Middle District of North Carolina uses this
formulation as both follow the guidelines set by the Till plurality.199
Eastern District of Missouri: Similar to the District of Hawaii, the local
rule in the Eastern District of Missouri200 divides each year into two six-month
periods.201 The prime rate is determined based on the national prime rate of
interest on first day of the month that precedes each period.202 Then the rules
require the bankruptcy court to add a 1.5% risk adjustment in order to set the
Chapter 13 discount rate.203
Western District of Missouri: The local bankruptcy rule in the Western
District of Missouri204 significantly differs from the rule in the Eastern District.
The rule divides each year into two six-month periods but opts to base its prime
rate on the five-year treasury note rate rather than using the national prime rate
of interest.205 The rule then requires the court to add a 3% risk adjustment in
order to get the final Chapter 13 discount rate.206
The difference between the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri
demonstrates the problems with these local rules. Debtors that reside in
neighboring counties, with the exact same debt, similar financial situations, and
that file on the same date will have to pay different amounts over the course of
their Chapter 13 plan purely because of the differences in the local rules.207
Considering that debtors generally only file for bankruptcy when they are
197
The rule itself does not state that the prime rate shall be taken from the Wall Street Journal, it merely
gives a link to the court’s webpage and says that the court will provide the appropriate determination of the
prime rate at this link. Bankr. W.D.N.C. LBR 3001-2(c). The webpage itself states that the composite prime rate
shall be taken from the Wall Street Journal. Prime Rates, NCWB.USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.ncwb.uscourts.
gov/prime-rates (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
198
Bankr. W.D.N.C. LBR 3001-2(b) (“The composite prime interest rate as published on the first business
day of the calendar month will be used as the basis for calculating the Till Rate for all cases filed during the
same calendar month.”); Bankr. W.D.N.C. LBR 3001-2(a).
199
See Bankr. E.D.N.C. LBR; Bankr. M.D.N.C. LBR.
200
Bankr. E.D. Mo. R. 3015-2(E).
201
Id. (“Absent evidence to the contrary, the applicable interest rate [on secured claims] shall be the rate
posted and published by the Clerk of Court as prescribed herein.”).
202
See Bankr. E.D. Mo. R. 3015-2(E)(1) & (2).
203
Id.
204
Bankr. W.D. Mo. R. 3084-1(G)(1) & (3) (“The posted ‘CHAPTER 13 RATE’ shall be determined by
the standing Chapter 13 trustee …. The posted Chapter 13 rate is, absent evidence to the contrary, presumed to
be the applicable rate.” (emphasis omitted)).
205
Bankr. W.D. Mo. R. 3084-1(G)(1).
206
Id.
207
Infra Section III.B.2.
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struggling financially, differences in plan payments can have great effects on a
debtor’s ability to purchase necessities and may cause some debtors to default
on their plan and lose their property.208
The Northern Mariana Islands: The rule created by the Northern Mariana
Islands209 follows the same structure as the Eastern District of Missouri rule, but
has different time periods.210 The rule starts the inquiry with the national prime
rate listed in the Wall Street Journal at the beginning of each period and then
adds a 1.5% risk adjustment.211
While these rules technically follow the guidance of the Till plurality by
using the formula approach, the problem is that they are shifting the burden of
proof by changing the presumption that the prime rate adequately compensates
the creditor.212 This could force debtors to pay higher interest payments on their
Chapter 13 Plan, which increases the chance of default and could have dire
consequences for the debtor such as losing their home,213 their only form of
transportation, or other important assets. It could also mean that some debtors’
Chapter 13 Plans will never be confirmed in the first place, which would deny
them an opportunity to try and save these assets.214
2. Districts That Use the Presumptive Contract Rate Approach
The bankruptcy courts in these districts have created local rules that use the
presumptive contract rate approach to set the Chapter 13 discount rate. As
mentioned previously, this method equates the Chapter 13 rate with the interest
rate contained in the original agreement between the debtor and the creditor.215
Proponents of this method believe that it is the best indicator of the debtor’s risk

208
Consequences for failing to make plan payments include dismissal of the case or conversion to Chapter
7. 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (2012).
209
D. N. Mar. I. Bankr. R. 3015-1(h).
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 484 (2004 (plurality opinion).
213
In this scenario, a debtor has an increased chance of defaulting on their plan due to the higher interest
payment on debts other than their mortgage, therefore leading to plan dismissal. Given the Bankruptcy Code’s
anti-modification provision, a Chapter 13 plan may not modify claims “secured only by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor’s principle residence.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012). Therefore, presumptive
discount rates will only have an indirect impact on a debtor losing their home. See id.
214
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (“The court shall [only] confirm a plan if the debtor will be able to make all
payments under the plan and to comply with the plan.”). If a plan is not confirmed, the only relief a debtor can
seek is through Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, which does not allow them to retain most of their assets. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d) and 541(a).
215
Supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
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of nonpayment because the parties have contractually agreed that this rate
accurately represents the debtor’s creditworthiness.216
District of Utah: The local bankruptcy rules for the District of Utah217
divide secured claims into two categories: (1) Secured claims that are either
excluded from 11 U.S.C. § 506218 or for which the debtor requests a court
valuation of the secured portion of the claim219 and (2) all other secured
claims.220
For claims in the first category, if the Chapter 13 plan does not designate a
discount rate, then “interest shall accrue at the rate set forth on line 9 of the filed
proof of claim [form].”221 The ninth line of the proof of claim form requires the
claimant to provide information regarding the property securing the claim,
including the interest rate at which the debtor would repay the claim: in other
words, the contractual interest rate.222 If the claimant fails to designate the
interest rate for its claim, then “interest shall accrue at 6% per annum.”223 The
debtor does not seek to modify the interest rate paid on claims in the second
category, so the present-value analysis does not apply.224
District of Vermont: The local bankruptcy rules for the District of
Vermont225 state that: “[A] creditor’s proof of claim shall control for purposes
of establishing … the interest rate to be paid on [the] allowed secured claim.”226
If the creditor does not file a timely proof of claim form, then the debtor is
allowed propose a different discount rate in part 3.2 of the Chapter 13 Plan by

216

Till, 541 U.S. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Bankr. D. Ut. LBR 2083-2(D)(1).
218
A secured claim is excluded from § 506 if “the creditor has a purchase money security interest securing
the debt that is the subject of the claim” and either (a) “the debt was incurred within the 910-day period preceding
the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle acquired for the
personal use of the debtor” or (b) “the collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was
incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012) (the “hanging paragraph”
of § 1325).
219
11 U.S.C. § 506.
220
Bankr. D. Ut. LBR 2083-2(D)(1). The local rule divides the claims based on what part of the Chapter
13 Plan that they are listed in. Part 3.1 of the plan refers to uncontested secured claims that the debtor does not
wish to modify, Part 3.2 refers to claims for which the debtor “request[s] that the court determine the value,”
and Part 3.3 refers to claims excluded by 11 U.S.C. § 506.
221
Id.
222
Official Form 410, Proof of Claim, U.S. COURTS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
form_b_410_16.pdf.
223
Bankr. D. Utah LBR 2083-2(D)(1).
224
Supra note 217.
225
Bankr. D. Vt. R. 3012-1.
226
Bankr. D. Vt. R. 3012-1(a).
217
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seeking a court valuation of the interest rate.227 If the debtor fails to do this, the
debtor must file a motion to amend the Plan to be eligible to receive a different
discount rate.228
Similar to the courts that predetermine the risk adjustment, these rules are
problematic because they are shifting the burden of proof onto the debtor. Rather
than “starting from a concededly low estimate and adjusting upward,” therefore
putting the burden on the creditor,229 these rules start at a high initial discount
rate and force the debtor to present evidence to lower it.230 This burden is
difficult to overcome when considering that the anchoring effect created by such
a high presumptive rate will likely cause judges to stick close to the higher
rate.231 This means that debtors in these districts will generally pay higher
discount rates, thereby forcing them to pay more money to satisfy their debts
which could adversely affect the Chapter 13 Plan’s chances of succeeding.
3. The District of South Carolina and the Southern District of Georgia
The two districts in this category, the District of South Carolina and the
Southern District of Georgia, each set a presumptive discount rate that does not
follow any previous approach and is inconsistent with the unrecognized holding
of Till.232
District of South Carolina: The local rule233 states that “a presumed
effective interest rate … will be set by the Court with the assistance of a
committee of trustees and members of the consumer bar.”234 If this rate is applied
to a secured claim in a Chapter 13 case, there is a rebuttable presumption that
the discount rate is reasonable and that the debtor is paying the present value on
such claims.235 According to the bankruptcy court’s website, the Chapter 13
discount rate is currently set at 6%.236

227

Bankr. D. Vt. R. 3012-1(b).
Id.
229
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted).
230
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 274.
231
A study was conducted which presented bankruptcy judges with a present-value analysis scenario.
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1227, 1233–37 (2006). Some bankruptcy judges were informed of the original contract rate but were told it was
irrelevant to the analysis. Id. at 1235. On average, these judges set rates that were 0.8–1.46% higher than judges
that were not given the original contract rate. Id.
232
See Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6; Bankr. S.D. Ga. R. 3001–2.
233
Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6.
234
Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6(a).
235
Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6(a), (b).
236
Interest Rate in Chapter 13 Cases, U.S. BANKR. CT. DIST. S.C. (Jan. 26, 2018, 1:29 PM), http://www.
228
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The problem with this rule is that it does not require the court to use any
particular methodology to create the discount rate.237 The “Chapter 13 Interest
Rate Committee” may increase or decrease the rate whenever it wishes and may
use whatever methodology it desires. The bankruptcy court’s website does not
mention how the committee determines the rate, so debtors and creditors have
no way of knowing how it was done.238 While the rule gives debtors and
creditors the ability to rebut this presumption,239 it likely is difficult for them to
do so without knowing the reasoning for the Committee’s determination.
Southern District of Georgia: The local bankruptcy rule240 directs the
Chapter 13 trustee to “pay interest at a rate of 12% per annum on all allowed
secured claims” unless otherwise ordered by the bankruptcy court.241 This
discount rate is not based on the formula approach, the presumptive contract rate
approach, or any other methodology used prior to Till. It is also does not change
to stay in line with the lending market, which is the reason for tying the Chapter
13 discount rate to the prime rate.242 Instead, this rule allows a bankruptcy court
to set the discount rate at either 12% or any other rate it deems to be warranted.243
Both of these rules give their respective court too much power to prescribe
the discount rate for Chapter 13 debtors. They allow the bankruptcy judge to
make his or her determination based solely on the evidentiary record with few
standards to frame their decision.244 This places a great burden on debtors
because they not only have to produce sufficient evidence to lower the rate, but
they also must do so without a clear understanding of what factors the judge will
consider.
B. How Differing Local Rules Affect Similarly-Situated Debtors
To demonstrate how presumptive Chapter 13 rates shift the burden of proof
onto debtors, this Part draws from examples found in Chapter 13 bankruptcy
cases with confirmed plans. Each scenario compares discount rate contained in
the plan to the prime rate, which is the rate at which the debtor satisfies its
scb.uscourts.gov/bulletin/1517584067.
237
See Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6.
238
See Interest Rate, supra note 239.
239
See Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6(c) (describing the process for how a party in interest may rebut the
presumed Chapter 13 discount rate).
240
Bankr. S.D. Ga. R. 3001-2.
241
Id.
242
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (plurality opinion).
243
Bankr. S.D. Ga. R. 3001-2.
244
The District of South Carolina’s local rule does not even indicate how often the Committee is supposed
to meet, so presumably it can do so whenever it desires. See Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6.
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present-value burden under Till. For the purposes of this Section, the “Till Rate”
is 5%.245
1. Presumptive Discount Rate vs. Till Rate
Mr. Elliot is a resident in the Western District of North Carolina who filed a
Chapter 13 case on June 18, 2018, in order to seek relief from his debts.246 While
his case involves a number of different claims, the most relevant is the secured
claim in part 3.2 of the plan which represents $28,400 worth of debt on a 2015
Toyota Tacoma.247
In the Western District of North Carolina, bankruptcy cases that were filed
on or after June 14, 2018, had a presumptive Chapter 13 discount rate of 7%.248
Using this rate, Mr. Elliot needs to pay $562.35 each month over the course of
his five-year plan.249 Mr. Elliot will pay $5,341.24 in interest payments due to
this presumptive discount rate.250
If the hypothetical Till Rate was used, Mr. Elliot would only have to pay a
5% discount rate on these claims. This would lower Mr. Elliot’s monthly
payments to $535.94 and his total interest payments to $3,756.58.251 This would
amount to a difference of $26.41 per month and $1,584.66 over the course of the
plan. While his monthly payment is not substantially higher under the
presumptive rate, it is important to note that Mr. Elliot is unemployed due to a
disability.252 He only brings in $3,843.68 each month, solely from Social
Security and VA disability benefits.253
245
This is equal to the prime rate for the period between June 14 and September 27, 2018, during which
each bankruptcy plan discussed was filed. Historical Prime Rate, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., https://www.
jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/historical-prime-rate.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
246
Chapter 13 Plan, BLOOMBERG LAW, (June 18, 2018), http://bloomberglaw.com (search “4:18-bk40237” in the search bar; filter by North Carolina Courts, follow the “Brandon Lee Elliott …” hyperlink; select
Entry #9, “Chapter 13 Plan …”) [hereinafter “Elliot Plan”].
247
Id. at 2–3.
248
Id. at 3.
249
Loan Calculator, BANKRATE, https://www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/loan-calculator.aspx
(last visited Nov. 23, 2018) (enter “28,400” as the Loan amount, “5” as the Loan term in years, and “7” as the
Interest rate per year).
250
Id.
251
Loan Calculator, supra note 252 (enter “28,400” as the Loan amount, “5” as the Loan term in years, and
“5” as the Interest rate per year).
252
Official Form 106I, BLOOMBERG L. (July 2, 2018), http://bloomberglaw.com (search “4:18-bk-40237”
in the search bar; filter by North Carolina Courts, follow the “Brandon Lee Elliott …” hyperlink; select Entry
#8, “Statement of Income …”; scroll down to “Official Form 106I”) [hereinafter “Elliot Form 106I”].
253
Id. at 2; Official Form 106J, BLOOMBERG L., (July 2, 2018), http://bloomberglaw.com (search “4:18bk-40237” in the search bar; filter by North Carolina Courts, follow the “Brandon Lee Elliott…” hyperlink;
select Entry #8, “Statement of Income…”; scroll down to “Official Form 106J”) [hereinafter “Elliot Form
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This scenario illustrates how shifting the burden of proof by creating a
presumption can lead to higher monthly payments for the debtor. Because Mr.
Elliot is unemployed and is unable to work, he has very little room for error
when it comes to making plan payments.254 Even so, the increase in monthly
payments is not very great, and Mr. Elliot might forgo the opportunity to fight
for a lower discount rate in favor of allocating his limited resources to litigating
an issue that has a more sizable impact on his plan payments.255
2. Western District of Missouri vs. Eastern District of Missouri
Mr. and Mrs. O’Brien filed a Chapter 13 case in the Western District of
Missouri on August 23, 2018.256 In Part 3.2 of the plan, the O’Briens sought
relief from a $50,739.46 claim, using their car as collateral.257 Because the car
is only valued at $31,469, the claim is only secured for that amount.258
The Western District of Missouri calculates its Chapter 13 discount rate by
adding a 3% adjustment rate to the applicable five-year treasury note rate.259 For
bankruptcy cases filed between July 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018, the
Chapter 13 discount rate was 5.74%.260 Using this number, the O’Briens will
pay $604.59 each month and $4,806.20 in interest payments over the course of
their five-year plan.261

106J”].
254

Elliot Form 106I, supra note 255, at 1.
Considering that Mr. Elliot, as a bankruptcy debtor, likely does not have access to all the information
about lending markets that is relevant to the court’s analysis about the risk premium, it is unlikely that he could
present enough evidence to lower the discount rate. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 484 (2004) (plurality
opinion).
256
Chapter 13 Plan, BLOOMBERG L. (June 29, 2018), http://bloomberglaw.com (Search “18–bk–50355”
in the search bar; filter by Missouri Courts, follow the “Sean Thomas O’Brien …” hyperlink; select Entry #2,
“Chapter 13 Plan …”) [hereinafter “O’Brien Plan”].
257
Id. at 2.
258
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest … is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s
interest in such property … and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s … is less
than the amount of such allowed claim.”).
259
Bankr. W.D. Mo. L.R. 3084-1(G)(1)(a) (“For cases with the initial plan filed between July 1 and
December 31, the interest rate shall be the 5 year treasury note rate as of the preceding June 1.”) The
corresponding five-year treasury note rate for August 1, 2018 (the preceding June 1, 2018 rate) was 2.74%. Daily
Treasury Yield Curve Rates, TREASURY.GOV, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/
interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
260
O’Brien Plan, supra note 259.
261
Loan Calculator, supra note 252 (enter “$31,469.00” as the Loan amount, “5” as the Loan term in
years, and “5.74” as the Interest rate per year).
255
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If the O’Briens lived in the Eastern District of Missouri, just 200 miles to the
east, they would be forced to pay a higher discount rate on this claim. The
Eastern District formulates its Chapter 13 discount rate by adding a 1.5% risk
adjustment to the prime rate.262 For bankruptcy cases filed between July 1, 2018
and December 31, 2018, the Chapter 13 discount rate is 6.25%.263 With this rate,
the O’Briens would pay $612.05 each month and $5,253.93 in interest over the
course of their plan.264
While this is not a significant increase in plan payments, it is important to
note the O’Briens’ financial situation. The O’Briens are a family of five265 with
a mother who works and a father who is unemployed due to disability.266 They
are below-median debtors, which means that they make less than the median
income for a family of the same size that resides in Missouri.267 The O’Briens
take home $5,358 each month, which represents a combination of $1,292 in
wages, $551 in VA disability benefits, and $3,513 in Social Security
payments.268 Similar to Mr. Elliot, the O’Briens are in a difficult financial
position; every additional dollar spent on plan payments may drastically increase
the chance that they default on their plan, and they also likely will not spend
resources to litigate the discount rate.
3. Presumptive Contract Rate Approach vs. Formula Approach
On July 6, 2018, the Giffords filed a Chapter 13 case in the District of
Vermont.269 In Part 3.2 of their Chapter 13 plan, the Giffords seek relief from a
$83,891.66 secured claim.270 Because Vermont uses the presumptive contract

262
Bankr. E.D. Mo. R. 3015-2(E)(2) (“For petitions filed between July 1 and December 31 of each year,
the interest rate shall be the prime rate on June 1 of the current year, plus 1.5%.”).
263
The prime rate on June 1, 2018 was 4.75%. Historical Prime Rate, supra note 248.
264
Loan Calculator, supra note 252 (enter “$31,469.00” as the Loan amount, “5” as the Loan term in years,
and “6.25” as the Interest rate per year).
265
Official Form 106J, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 23, 2018), http://bloomberglaw.com (search “18–bk–
50355” in the search bar; filter by Missouri Courts, follow the “Sean Thomas O’Brien …” hyperlink; select
Entry #1, “Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition …” and scroll down to Official Form 106J) [hereinafter “O’Brien
Form 106J”]. Further, one of the O’Brien’s children is disabled. Id.
266
Official Form 106I, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 23, 2018), http://bloomberglaw.com (search “18–bk–50355”
in the search bar; filter by Missouri Courts, follow the “Sean Thomas O’Brien …” hyperlink; select Entry #1,
“Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition …” and scroll down to Official Form 106I) [hereinafter “O’Brien Form 106I”].
267
11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(2) (2012); id. § 101(39A); Quick Facts: Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/mo (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
268
O’Brien Form 106I, supra note 269, at 1.
269
Chapter 13 Plan, BLOOMBERG L. (July 6, 2018), http://bloomberglaw.com (search “2:18-bk-10278” in
the search bar; filter by Vermont Courts, follow the “John Pearl Gifford …” hyperlink; select Entry #8, “Chapter
13 Plan …”) [hereinafter “Gifford Plan”].
270
Id. at 3.
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rate approach to calculate the Chapter 13 discount rate, the Giffords will have to
pay the interest rate provided in their original contract with the creditor unless
they are successfully able to challenge the rate.271 Based on their Chapter 13
plan, it appears that the original contract stipulated that they pay 6% interest on
the debt.272 Based on these numbers, the Giffords will have to pay $1,621.86 per
month, and $13,419.99 in interest on this claim over the course of their plan.273
If the Giffords lived in a district that followed the Till holding, they would
pay significantly less over the course of their plan—only $1,583.14 per month
and $11,096.69 over the course of the plan.274 This amounts to a difference of
over $2,000 in additional interest payments solely because the District of
Vermont’s local rule shifts the burden of proof onto the Giffords. While the
Giffords have a net monthly income of $4,060.70, they are spending $3,952.84
of it on bankruptcy payments each month.275 Even though the Till Rate would
only allow the Giffords to keep an extra $38.52 each month, it would allow them
extra flexibility in case of an unexpected emergency.
Every dollar matters for bankruptcy debtors, and presumptive discount rates
unfairly force them to spend more money on plan payments than they should
have to. This not only increases the chance that these debtors will default on
their plans, it also takes away money that could be used to help them get back
on their feet and get the fresh start that they deserve.
4. Summary of the Impact of Presumptive Interest Rates on Debtors
These presumptive rules create a non-uniformity problem in the bankruptcy
court system, which forces debtors in these districts to pay more in interest
payments than they might otherwise have to. This problem is exacerbated by an
“anchoring effect,” which makes it more likely that a bankruptcy judge will
choose a discount rate that is close to the presumptive rate.276

271

O’Brien, supra note 2, at 274.
Gifford Plan, supra note 272.
273
Loan Calculator, supra note 252 (enter “$83,891.66” as the Loan amount, “5” as the Loan term in
years, and “6” as the Interest rate per year).
274
Id. (enter “$83,891.66” as the Loan amount, “5” as the Loan term in years, and “5” as the Interest rate
per year).
275
Official Form 106J, BLOOMBERG L. (July 6, 2018), http://bloomberglaw.com (search “12:18-bk10278” in the search bar; filter by Vermont Courts, follow the “John Pearl Gifford …” hyperlink; select Entry
#1, “Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition …” and scroll down to Official Form 106J) [hereinafter “Gifford Form
106J”]; Gifford Plan, supra note 272.
276
Infra notes 327–331 and accompanying text.
272
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The Elliot case and the Gifford case demonstrate the fundamental unfairness
of using a presumptive discount rate. Solely because Mr. Elliot and the Giffords
reside in districts that predetermine the risk adjustment for the Chapter 13
discount rate, they are forced to pay additional expenses in the form of interest
payments.277 Considering that Mr. Elliot is unemployed and unable to work,278
and the Giffords are spending nearly every dollar of their net income on plan
payments,279 even a small difference in plan payments may greatly affect the
success of their plans. While other Chapter 13 debtors may not have the same
restrictions as Mr. Elliot or have as high of plan payments as the Giffords, they
may be similarly affected by changes in their monthly payments.
Additionally, the O’Brien case280 illustrates the fact that the rules governing
presumptive discount rates are not created based on circumstances unique to the
districts’ geographical location, but instead seem to be made almost arbitrarily.
It is difficult to imagine that debtors residing in the Western District of Missouri
are systematically more likely to default on their plans than those residing in the
Eastern District. While there are certainly differences between debtors in the two
districts, there are also differences between debtors in cities like Kansas City and
St. Louis and those residing in other cities in Missouri.281 Nevertheless, debtors
residing in the Eastern District are being forced to pay to pay higher discount
rates and higher total interest payments as if the location of their residence
determines how likely they are to default on their Chapter 13 payments.282
IV. PROBLEMS CREATED BY LOCAL RULES THAT SET PRESUMPTIVE RATES
By creating presumptive discount rates through local rules, these districts
greatly affect how much each debtor will pay in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy.283
Because these local bankruptcy rules are shifting the burden of proof onto
debtors, they are altering “the rules of decision by which [the] court will
[adjudicate]” the debtor’s rights.284 Thus, these rules are creating substantive
law, they are in violation of the Rules Enabling Act, and they must be repealed.
The following sections detail the restrictions contained in the potential issues

277

Supra Sections III.B.2 and III.B.3.
Elliot Form 106I, supra note 255 at 1.
279
Gifford Form 106J, supra note 278 at 2.
280
Supra Section III.B.2.
281
2016 Average Annual Wages, MO. ECON. RES. & INFO. CTR., https://meric.mo.gov/media/pdf/2016average-annual-wages (last visited Sept.13, 2019).
282
Supra notes 264, 267 and accompanying text.
283
Supra Part III.
284
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010).
278
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concerning the Rules Enabling Act and non-uniformity problems, and then
examine what could be done to fix these issues.
A. Violation of the Rules Enabling Act
While these local rules may appear to merely govern the procedure for how
the discount rate is determined, the rules alter substantive law by shifting the
burden of proof in the courts’ present-value analyses. The Supreme Court has
never held that a court rule violates the Rules Enabling Act,285 but it has held
that both burdens of proof286 and presumptions287 are substantive law. These
elements are so critical to the adjudication of a claim that altering them
fundamentally changes the way a case is litigated.288 Therefore, any local rule
that shifts the allocation of the burden of proof is violating the Rules Enabling
Act because it alters the substantive rights of litigants.
To determine whether local bankruptcy rules that create presumptive rates
shift the burden of proof, it is necessary to determine who initially bears this
burden. Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the requirements for
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan,289 and the debtor bears the burden of proving
that the proposed plan satisfies these requirements.290 This includes the burden
of proving that the debtor is paying the creditor the present-value of their
allowed claims.291 The four present-value methodologies were merely different
tests used to determine the threshold rate that a debtor must pay to satisfy this
burden, at which point the burden shifts to the creditor to demonstrate that the
threshold rate is insufficient. Thus, the ultimate issue in Till was not determining
which methodology to use, but rather to ascertain where this threshold lies.
If Till is viewed through this lens, it is possible to get a majority holding
from the fractured decision. Under the test established in Marks v. United States,
when the Supreme Court fails to reach a five-Justice majority, “the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”292 While Justice Thomas

285

Id.
See Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20–21 (2000).
287
Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959).
288
See Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 20–21.
289
11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012).
290
See, e.g., In re Hill, 268 B.R. 548, 552 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (“The debtor, as the chapter 13 plan
proponent, has the burden of proof on all elements of plan confirmation.”).
291
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
292
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). In other words, in a plurality opinion, lower courts
should look to the most basic issued agreed upon by 5 or more Justices to find the binding precedent. See id.
286
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wrote separately from the plurality to express his view that a risk premium is
unnecessary, he agreed with the plurality (creating a Marks majority) on one
critical issue: A debtor presumptively satisfies its present-value burden of proof
by paying the prime rate.
The plurality viewed the present-value analysis as a two-step process: (1)
create a “presumptive rate” and then (2) give one of the parties the burden of
rebutting it.293 The plurality chose to start with the prime rate and then “place[]
the evidentiary burden squarely on the creditors” to prove is the rate’s
inadequacy.294 By shifting the burden from the debtor to the creditor at this point,
the plurality implicitly held that a debtor satisfies his or her present-value
obligation by proposing to use the prime rate as the applicable discount rate.295
Thus, in the plurality’s view, the debtor is presumed to meet his or her presentvalue burden by paying the prime rate, and thereafter the burden falls on the
creditor to prove that the prime rate does not adequately account for the debtor’s
risk of nonpayment.
Justice Thomas also adopted the view that a debtor satisfies his or her
present-value burden by using the prime rate as the discount rate; his
concurrence essentially stands for the proposition that such a showing by the
debtor cannot be rebutted.296 Under his view, the prime rate will always satisfy
the debtor’s burden, and the burden will never shift to the creditor.297 While this
difference was enough to warrant a separate opinion, Justice Thomas and the
plurality agree on the “narrow grounds” that the prime rate initially satisfies the
debtor’s present-value burden, therefore creating a majority opinion on this
point.
By predetermining the risk adjustment (or in some cases the entire discount
rate) used in Chapter 13 cases, local bankruptcy rules shift at least part of the
burden onto the debtors. This alters a debtor’s substantive rights by requiring
him or her to litigate the discount rate in order to lower it, even though the burden
of proof should already be satisfied. Using this framework, this Part proceeds to
identify how each category of local rules identified in Part III shifts the burden
of proof and violates the Rules Enabling Act.

293
294
295
296
297

Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 484–85 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 486 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 487.
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The following chart attempts to visualize how these local rules shift the
burden of proof from creditors to debtors. Each line in the chart corresponds to
the following discount rates: (a) the prime rate, which satisfies the debtor’s
burden under Till; (b) the rate created by using formula method with a 2% risk
adjustment, as used in the Elliot case; (c) a presumptive contract rate of 6%, as
used in the Gifford case; (d) the 6% discount rate used by South Carolina
bankruptcy courts; and (e) the 12% discount rate used by courts in the Southern
District of Georgia.298 The solid bar represents the prime rate, the dotted bar
represents the creditor’s burden to raise the discount rate, and the vertical line
represents the discount rate created by each type of local rule. The debtor’s
burden of lowering the discount rate back to the prime rate, which is only created
when local rules alter the initial discount rate, is depicted with diagonal lines.
Figure I: The Shifting Burden of Proof Caused by Local Rules
(a) Till Holding [5%]

(b) Formula Approach with
2% Risk Adjustment [7%]

(c) Presumptive Contract
Rate [6%]

(d) South Carolina Rule [6%]

(e) Southen District of
Georgia Rule [12%]
0%

2%

Prime Rate

4%

Debtor's Burden

6%

Creditor's Burden

8%

10%

Initial Discount Rate

12%

14%
Discount rate paid
by the Debtor

Local rules that create a predetermined risk adjustment (shown in Figure
I(b)) shift the burden of proof partially onto the shoulders of the debtor
because they create a higher starting point for the present-value analysis.299
Rather than forcing the creditor to present all the relevant information,
debtors now must incur high costs to obtain information about lending
markets because they do not have the same access as creditors.300
Considering that there is not much payoff to lowering the discount rate,301
298
The O’Brien case is not included in this chart because it compares two different local rules to each
other rather than comparing a local rule to the prime rate.
299
Supra note 215 and accompanying text.
300
See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 484 (2004) (plurality opinion).
301
Recall the case of Mr. Elliot, who would be forced to pay an extra $400.52 over the course of his plan
due to his district’s presumptive discount rate. Supra Section III.B.1. While this is not a large amount of money,
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debtors will likely choose not to litigate the present-value analysis so that
they may allocate their resources to an issue that may have a larger effect on
the size of plan payments.302 This means that debtors in this district may
systematically end up paying higher discount rates due to this presumptive
risk adjustment.
Local rules that follow the presumptive contract rate approach (Figure I(c))
heavily shift the burden of proof onto the debtors because the present-value
analysis starts at a potentially extremely high initial rate and forces the debtor to
present evidence to lower it.303 This is the exact opposite of the scheme
envisioned by the Till plurality.304 While these debtors may have a large
incentive to litigate this issue when facing an unreasonably high contract rate,305
they face the same limited access to information that could help them lower the
discount rate.306 This problem is exacerbated by an “anchoring effect,” which
negatively impacts the debtor’s ability to lower the rate.307
Further, when a creditor sets an interest rate on a loan, it is not solely
attempting to create a rate that accurately captures the debtor’s risk of
nonpayment—the creditor is also trying to make a profit on the loan.308 In some
cases, a creditor may exploit people with poor financial record by setting
unreasonably high interest rates and default interest rates.309 Often, those who
accept these high interest rates have nowhere else to turn and are forced to accept
unfair terms.310 This means that the presumptive discount rate will often start at

it still has a substantial impact on his finances. Supra Section III.B.1.
302
Infra notes 327–329 and accompanying text.
303
Till, 541 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 274.
304
Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion). Because Justice Thomas advocates for a methodology that will
always produce lower discount rates than both the formula approach and the presumptive contract rate approach,
this burden shift also runs afoul of his scheme as well. See id. at 491 (Thomas, J., concurring).
305
Because the presumptive contract rate approach typically creates discount rates significantly larger than
the formula approach, lowering the discount rate may have a substantial effect on plan payment amounts. See
supra Section III.B.3.
306
Till, 541 U.S. at 484 (plurality opinion).
307
Even though both the formula approach and the presumptive contract rate should theoretically produce
the same discount rate, anchoring effects tend to influence judges to set higher discount rates. Id.; infra notes
327 329
– and accompanying text.
308
Ryan Furhmann, How Banks Set Interest Rates on Your Loans, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 18, 2017),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080713/how-banks-set-interest-rates-your-loans.asp
(“The
truth is, [creditors] are looking to maximize profits ….”).
309
Bill Fay, What is Predatory Lending?, DEBT (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.debt.org/credit/predatorylending/ (“[Predatory Lenders] prey on people who need immediate cash for emergencies such as paying medical
bills, making a home repair or car payment. These lenders also target borrowers with credit problems or people
who recently lost their jobs [that] could disqualify them from conventional loans or lines of credit.”).
310
Id.
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the highest point possible and debtors—who have the entire burden of proof—
will have a much tougher time getting a fair rate.
The rules in the District of South Carolina (Figure I(d)) and the Southern
District of Georgia (Figure I(e)) shift the burden of proof, and thus violate the
Rules Enabling Act, by changing the presumptive rate.311 Because neither of
these rules follow the holding under Till, nor do they describe the methodology
behind how the rates are set,312 debtors are not given a clear understanding of
what factors judges consider when hearing their case. This creates an even
bigger burden on debtors, who now must gather a wider range of information to
argue their case. Considering that debtors do not have ready access to such
information,313 these rules may significantly alter the substantive rights of
debtors in these districts.
As shown in Figure I, all local bankruptcy rules that create a presumptive
Chapter 13 discount rate shift the burden of proof onto debtors. Even though the
Till Court held that the prime rate should satisfy the debtor’s present-value
burden, debtors residing in districts with such rules must litigate to lower their
discount rate back to the prime rate. Considering that burdens of proof are
substantive aspects of a debtor’s claim, these rules are modifying the substantive
rights of debtors.314 Thus, these rules violate the Rules Enabling Act. They must
be abolished, and a clear, nationwide rule for conducting a present-value
analysis should be articulated in their place.
B. Non-Uniformity
Further, these local rules are problematic because they create non-uniformity
in the bankruptcy court system. While it is plausible that debtors residing in
different districts should have to pay different discount rates based on the
economic conditions in their location, these rules are not meant to account for
these conditions.315 For example, it is hard to conceive of a reason why the
Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri should have different rules for
conducting the present-value analysis. Nevertheless, residents of the Eastern
District of Missouri are given a higher initial discount rate than their neighbors
in the Western District.316

311
312
313
314
315
316

Supra Section III.A.3.
See Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6; Bankr. S.D. Ga. R. 3001-2.
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 484 (2004) (plurality opinion).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2012); Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20–21 (2000).
Pardo & Watts, supra note 10, at 437–38.
Supra notes 259–267 and accompanying text.
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These non-uniformity issues, combined with other factors that impact a
debtor’s ability to change the applicable discount rate, lead to an imbalance in
debtors’ access to justice. Debtors in districts that set a presumed rate likely will
not expend the resources to litigate this issue because it does not have a large
impact;317 however, it will force them to pay more money over the course of
their plans.318 Districts that create a high initial discount rate may accidentally
create anchoring effects which influence bankruptcy judges to set higher
discount rates, even if the evidence suggests that a lower rate still adequately
compensates the creditor. Also, debtors residing in the District of South Carolina
or the Southern District of Georgia bear higher information costs because these
districts’ local rules do not specify the methodology that bankruptcy judges
should use to conduct the present-value analysis.319
Bankruptcy courts should strive to ensure that similarly situated debtors pay
the same amount over the course of their plans. That does not mean that debtors
should all pay the same rate, nor does it mean that a debtor’s geographical
location should not be accounted for in the present-value analysis. Rather, courts
should attempt to create uniformity by following a single, nationwide presentvalue methodology, with the same starting point for every Chapter 13 debtor.
This will help ensure that each debtor receives a discount rate and monthly
payment amount that are based on the debtor’s financial situation, rather than
ones that are influenced by factors they cannot control.
C. Access to Justice
Even if these local rules do not violate the Rules Enabling Act and nonuniformity was acceptable, they are still problematic because they deny equal
access to justice to some debtors. Presumptive discount rates create biases in the
minds of both bankruptcy judges and debtors, which lead to systematically
higher discount rates for debtors that reside in districts that have them.
Bankruptcy judges “anchor” their final determination to the initial discount
rate,320 and debtors “lump” their decision-making by choosing not to litigate
these claims due to their relatively small impact on plan payments.321

317

Infra notes 334–335 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.B.1.
319
See Bankr. D.S.C. R. 3015-6; Bankr. S.D. Ga. R. 3001-2.
320
Rachlinski, Guthrie & Wistrich, supra note 234, at 1233–37.
321
See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124–25 (1974).
318
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Bankruptcy judges are heavily influenced by the initial starting point of the
discount rate, which leads them to overweigh its importance relative to other
factors.322 In 2006, a team of researchers conducted a study, based on the same
facts that are in Till, to determine the effect that anchoring has on bankruptcy
judges when they administer a present-value analysis.323 The judges were split
into two groups—a control group that was not given the debtor’s original
contract interest rate and an “anchor” group that was.324 Both groups were
reminded of Till’s holding and were told that the original interest rate is
irrelevant to the court’s determination of the Chapter 13 discount rate.325 Even
with this reminder, judges in the anchor group set rates that were 0.8–1.46
percentage points higher than judges in the control group.326 This difference
could force debtors to pay hundreds or even thousands of dollars more in interest
payments over the course of their bankruptcy plans.327
While this study was limited to examining the effects of the original contract
interest rate, it is likely that these same effects will occur in districts that
predetermine the formula method’s risk adjustment. Considering that 17.1% of
bankruptcy judges “engaged in no adjustment” by selecting either the prime rate
or the original contract rate, it is likely that some bankruptcy judges in these
districts will accept the presumptive rate without conducting a proper presentvalue analysis.328 Because bankruptcy judges have this tendency to anchor their
analysis to the initial rate, debtors residing in districts with presumptive rates
will not have the same chance of receiving a fair discount rate that is based on
an analysis of their financial situations.
Further, while these amounts are high enough to make a significant
difference in plan payments, they are still low enough that debtors may choose
to forgo litigating this issue in order to focus on more high-impact arguments.329
Because there are high costs associated with litigation, debtors will choose to
spend their resources litigating other claims, such as the value of the debtor’s
property, which could lower plan payments significantly more than a change to
the discount rate.330 Considering that debtors usually enter bankruptcy when
322

Rachlinski, Guthrie & Wistrich, supra note 234, at 1236.
Id. at 1233–34.
324
Id. at 1235.
325
Id.
326
These percentages were reached after excluding judges who “engaged in no adjustment” by accepting
the prime rate alone as the appropriate discount rate. Id.
327
Id.
328
See id. at 1235 n.46.
329
See Galanter, supra note 324, at 124–25.
330
See id.
323
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they are in dire financial straits, it makes little sense for a debtor to dedicate a
portion of their limited resources to fight over a few hundred dollars.
Because presumptive rates create cognitive biases which disenfranchise
already vulnerable debtors, the local rules creating them are unjust. The
combination of anchoring and lumping effects systematically force debtors to
pay higher discount rates because judges are prone to set higher rates and debtors
will opt to forgo reducing them. This means that debtors residing in districts that
set presumptive rates through local rules are forced to make higher plan
payments and suffer a higher risk of defaulting on their plans, thus increasing
the chance that they will lose their property.331 These debtors do not have an
equal opportunity to vindicate their rights granted by Chapter 13 bankruptcy
solely because they live in a district that enforces these local rules.
D. Implications
Because the local rules violate the Rules Enabling Act, they should be
repealed. Bankruptcy rulemaking committees do not have the power to create
laws that alter the substantive rights of debtors.332 Once this has been done, all
bankruptcy courts should begin following the currently unrecognized majority
holding established by Till by setting the initial discount rate equal to the
national prime rate, and then placing the entire evidentiary burden on the
creditors to prove it is inadequate. This will not only put these courts in
compliance with Till’s holding, it will also promote uniformity in the bankruptcy
court system by helping to ensure that every Chapter 13 debtor undergoes the
same analysis and receives similar treatment, no matter where they reside.
The downside to leaving this change to the court system is that it would
likely take a lot of time and expense to come to fruition. The local rules will
remain in effect until each bankruptcy court voluntarily repeals their rules, each
local rule is successfully challenged in court, or the Supreme Court reaffirms the
unrecognized holding in Till as binding precedent in a new case. While this
process is ongoing, the present-value analysis landscape will remain fractured,
and many Chapter 13 debtors will continue to suffer from the defects created by
current local rules.

331
If a debtor fails to make payments on his or her plan, it may be converted to Chapter 7 bankruptcy
wherein all of his or her assets are sold to pay creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (2012).
332
28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2012); In re Adams, 734 F.2d 1094, 1099 (5th Cir. 1984); Pardo & Watts, supra
note 10, at 437.
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To alleviate this problem and ensure speedy compliance by bankruptcy
courts, Congress should codify the Till approach in the Bankruptcy Code. This
amendment should state that unless the parties agree otherwise, the presentvalue analysis requires a discount rate that (i) is greater than or equal to the
national prime rate and (ii) accounts for the debtor’s risk of nonpayment. Each
debtor would always pay a discount rate equal to the prime rate, unless either
the parties agree to a different rate or the creditor challenges the prime rate in
court. The creditor would then bear the full burden of proving that the prime rate
inadequately accounts for the risk that the debtor will not pay back his or her
debts.
Alternatively, if Congress finds that the prime rate will never adequately
compensate a creditor for its claims, then it could alter the approach created by
the Till majority holding. This could be done by choosing a higher starting point
for the analysis or by selecting a different present-value method altogether. By
codifying a uniform methodology in the Bankruptcy Code, Congress would have
the flexibility to create an ideal present-value approach.
It is preferable that Congress finds a solution to this issue rather than leaving
it to the courts so that uniformity is achieved in a timely manner. No matter what
methodology it selected, amending the Bankruptcy Code to specify a single,
nationwide approach will place every Chapter 13 debtor on a level playing field.
While Congress would not be able to account for the subjective thoughts of
every bankruptcy court judge, a unified process would improve consistency
between districts and give every debtor the same ability to vindicate his or her
rights. This should be done quickly so that debtors will no longer have to bear
the burden imposed on them by the current system.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court failed to reach a majority opinion in Till v. SCS
Credit Corp., it appeared to leave a major gap in the Bankruptcy Code
unresolved. Justice Thomas nobly tried to make the discount rate as low as
possible while still fairly compensating creditors, but his decision to create his
own approach left the bankruptcy court system in a state of confusion.
Bankruptcy courts did not recognize that Justice Thomas agreed with the
majority on a critical point: The debtor satisfied its present-value burden by
paying a discount rate greater than or equal to the prime rate of interest. Instead,
they viewed the Till Court’s failure to select a specified discount rate approach
as a failure to fill the gap in present-value analysis.
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This uncertainty led some bankruptcy courts to use local rules to fill in this
perceived gap by creating a presumed discount rate. These rules set the initial
discount rate higher that the prime rate, which effectively places the burden of
proof onto the debtor to lower it. Because five Justices on the Till Court agreed
that the debtor fulfilled its burden by paying the prime rate—at which point the
entire burden shifts to the creditor to raise it—these rules violate the Rules
Enabling Act by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof.
Because these rules violate the Rules Enabling Act, they should be repealed.
Bankruptcy courts should begin following the unrecognized holding in Till by
starting their present-value analysis at the prime rate and then placing the burden
on the creditor to show the prime rate does not adequately capture the debtor’s
risk of nonpayment. Alternatively, Congress can amend the Bankruptcy Code to
either codify the Till holding or to select a different methodology entirely. No
matter how it is done, Congress and the courts should strive to create a single,
nationwide present-value approach so every debtor will be given a fair chance
to obtain the bankruptcy relief they deserve.
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